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CONFUSED SEAS,* THE WATERS WE SAIL ON IN
1980
Peter T. Fay**
INTRODUCTION
In recent years significant developments have occurred in the
law governing maritime personal injury. While maritime employ-
ment has long been recognized as unusually hazardous, with the con-
comitant need for immediate and certain relief,' relief provisions
historically have been subject to inconsistent or arbitrary applica-
tion. This survey briefly discusses the background of this confusion,
in specific areas, in an effort to put into context recent currents that
indicate the development of new approaches to compensation for
maritime personal injuries. Future courses may be more difficult to
predict than the shifting tides.
WRONGFUL DEATH TODAY
Persons engaged in maritime employment may be divided func-
tionally and legally into two broad categories: crew members or
seamen and shore-based or waterfront workers.! Benefits to sur-
vivors of these groups, as well as compensation for personal injury,
are governed by general maritime law and several mutually ex-
clusive statutes. This multifarious coverage of law often gives rise
to inconsistent remedies, a result which is at odds with the quest for
uniformity in maritime law.' Thus, the confused seas of 1980.
*"Confused seas are defined as a highly disturbed water surface without a single,
well defined direction of wave travel. A series of waves or swells causing another
wave system at an angle is also called a cross sea." NAVIGATION DICTIONARY 55 (1969).
**Judge, United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The author is extremely
grateful for the assistance of his law clerk, Mr. Lewis F. Murphy, J.D., University of
Florida, and Ms. Neisa DeWitt, third-year student at the University of Miami School of
Law.
1. For example, during fiscal year 1971 there were 68,464 reported longshoremen
injuries alone, 29,006 of which occurred in the fifth circuit. Note, The Docking of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: How Far Can It Come
Ashore?, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 681, 681 (1977). Statistics for seamen injuries, no doubt,
are as appalling.
2. 1A. BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, § 1 (7th ed. 1977).
3. See generally Day, Maritime Wrongful Death & Survival Recovery; The
Need For Legislative Reform, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 648 (1964); Note, Maritime Wrongful
Death: Higginbotham and The Search for Uniformity, 3 MAR. LAW. 289 (1979).
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Consider the following hypothetical: A passenger (Mrs. Skid-
more) of vessel #1 (a "seaworthy" vessel) falls overboard in the
navigable territorial waters of Louisiana and drowns. The accident
is the result of negligent operation of the vessel. A seaman (Ivy)
drowns in a rescue attempt; another seaman (Christofferson) is in-
jured; and a longshoreman (Alvez), employed on the vessel, loses an
eye when a lifeline being tossed from the ship hits him. Vessel #2
("unseaworthy" by virtue of improper rescue equipment) is close by.
A seaman (Hlodan) and a longshoreman (Gaudet), following the cap-
tain's negligent orders, also jump in to save Mrs. Skidmore. Hlodan
drowns at the scene. Gaudet is pulled from the water alive but
ultimately dies from complications. Prior to his death, Gaudet is suc-
cessful in an individual claim for injuries. A second seaman (Cruz) is
injured in the attempt but rescued. In the confusion, another
passenger (Higginbotham), boards a lifeboat to help but is taken by
the current beyond the territorial waters of the United States
where the boat overturns and he drowns.
Under present case law recovery might be as follows: Vessel #1
(seaworthy but negligent):
a) Deceased passenger Skidmore's husband and children in a
general maritime law wrongful death action may recover pecuniary
damages and non-pecuniary damages such as the husband's loss of
consortium, loss of society, and loss of nurture and guidance to the
minor children;
b) Deceased seaman Ivy's next-of-kin would be limited to only
pecuniary damages in an action for negligence against his employer
under the Jones Act;
c) Injured seaman Christofferson's spouse would be denied any
action for non-pecuniary loss of consortium under either the Jones
Act or general maritime law;
d) The spouse of injured longshoreman Alvez may recover
damages for non-pecuniary loss of society, under general maritime
law, in addition to the pecuniary damages recovered by her hus-
band.
Vessel #2 (unseaworthy and negligent):
e) Deceased seaman Hlodan's next-of-kin under a joint Jones
Act and unseaworthiness claim may recover non-pecuniary damages
for the decedent's conscious pain and suffering before death;
f) Deceased longshoreman Gaudet's widow in a general
maritime law wrongful death action based upon unseaworthiness
may recover non-pecuniary damages for loss of support, services,
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and society in addition to funeral expenses, even though Gaudet
recovered damages for his personal injuries before he died;
g) Injured seaman Cruz's spouse would be denied any action
for non-pecuniary loss of consortium under either the Jones Act or
general maritime law;
h) Deceased passenger Higginbotham's widow in a general
maritime wrongful death action, when the death has occurred on the
high seas, is precluded from recovering loss of society and is limited
to pecuniary damages as dictated by the Death on the High Seas
Act.'
Such confusion, while untenable in the abstract, is perhaps more
understandable given the origins and haphazard development of the
law in this area.
HISTORY
In its seminal decision, The Harrisburg,5 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that, based upon English admiralty law and the common law,
no right of action existed under general maritime law for the
wrongful death of seamen. The Harrisburg court specifically left
open the use of state statutes for supplemental relief,' and in The
Hamilton7 a unanimous court permitted the use of the Delaware
wrongful death statute for such recovery.' This application of state
law was extended later to wrongful deaths occurring within ter-
ritorial navigable waters.' However, due to the absence of survival
4. The reauer probably will recognize the hypothetical parties from the following
cases:
Ship # 1: a) Skidmore v. Greuninger, 506 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1975).
b) Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2927 (1980).
c) Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976).
d) American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 100 S. Ct. 1673 (1980).
Ship # 2: e) Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980).
f) Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
g) Cruz v. Hendy Int'l Co., No. 77-2700 (5th Cir. 1980). Subsequent to the
writing of this paper but prior to its publication, the court reconsidered
its holding in Cruz and has now recognized the claim for loss of society
by Cruz's spouse. This opinion is expected to be published shortly in the
Federal Reporter.
h) Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
5. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
6. Id. at 214.
7. 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
8. The Court utilized a fiction finding that the maritime law adopted the state
statute. Id. at 404-05. See Fallon, Rights, Remedies and Recovery for Wrongful Death
Under Maritime Law, 1 MAR. LAW. 32, 33-34 (1975).
9. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
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statutes in some states, coverage was sporadic or, if allowed, the
theories utilized were inconsistent."0 Ostensibly to meet this situa-
tion, Congress enacted in 1920 both the Jones Act" and the Death
on the High Seas Act (DOHSA).2
The Jones Act provided a cause of action to a seaman and his
survivors for injury or death due to his employer's negligence. The
statute was upheld as a permissible extension of maritime law which
allowed an injured seaman to assert his right of action either on the
admiralty side of the court or on the common law side where he
would have a right of trial by jury." This Act was patterned after
the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), and those provisions
applicable to railway employees were incorporated into the Jones
Act." Thus, in the instance of a seaman's death, the Act provided
for a survival 5 as well as a wrongful death action, 6 but recovery
was limited judicially to mere pecuniary damages. 7 The Supreme
Court construed this incorporation to mean that, although the provi-
sions of FELA applied to Jones Act actions when the application
was reasonable, the "very words of the FELA must not be lifted
bodily from their context and applied mechanically to the specific
facts of maritime events."'8 Therefore, the courts exercised a
10. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 34.
11. 38 Stat. 1164 (1920) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976)) provides:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial
by jury, and in such actions all statutes of the United States modifying or extend-
ing the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply; and in the case of the death of any seaman as a result of
any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may main-
tain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such ac-
tion all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action
for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable ....
12. 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976)) provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the
United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit
for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the ex-
clusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent
relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if
death had not ensued.
13. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
14. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
15. Id § 59.
16. Id § 51.
17. See Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913). The wording of the
statute does not contain a measure of damages, therefore this limitation is judicially
created.
18. Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209 (1955).
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measure of flexibility in awarding damages. 9 Significantly, the
Jones Act plaintiff has to be either a seaman who has suffered per-
sonal injury in the course of his employment or the personal
representative of any seaman who has died as a result of such per-
sonal injury.
DOHSA, on the other hand, provided a wrongful death action for
any "wrongful act, neglect, or default" resulting in death beyond
territorial waters." This action was extended collectively to the sur-
viving spouse, parent, child, and dependent relatives of the deceased.'
Although limited to pecuniary loss, DOHSA has generally been held
to cover (1) loss of support, which includes all financial contributions
the decedent would have made during his lifetime to the
beneficiaries; (2) loss of services the decedent would have rendered
to the beneficiaries; (3) loss of the nurture, guidance, and education a
parent would have given his minor children; and (4) loss of in-
heritable estate.2
When a DOHSA action was combined with a Jones Act claim,
recovery for the decedent's pain and suffering could be awarded
under the Jones Act. When the beneficiaries of a non-seaman
brought a DOHSA action, the courts allowed recovery for the
dependents' pecuniary loss to be supplemented by a recovery for
the decedent's pain and suffering before death under the survival
provision of a relevant state statute. 3 This state of inconsistent
statutory law, as related to both the nature of recovery and the
classes of beneficiaries, persisted until 1970, despite the federal
courts' attempt to impose some degree of order on the "statutory
chaos.2 4 Unfortunately, during this time period another confusing
dimension was added.
THE TERRITORIAL WATERS ANOMALY
Prior to the Jones Act and DOHSA, the Supreme Court, in The
Osceola, 5 recognized a seaman's right under general maritime law
to indemnity from the shipowner for injuries received as a conse-
quence of the "unseaworthiness" of the vessel, but barred an action
19. In this vein, no doubt, pecuniary damages have not been limited to the portion
of the decedent's wages due the survivor but have included loss of nurture to a child,
pain and suffering, medical expenses, and impairment of earning capacity. See 2 M.
NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 697 (3d ed. 1970).
20. See note 12, supra.
21. Id
22. See generally S. SPEIStR, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3.1 (2d ed. 1975).
23. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 362-67 (2d ed. 1975).
24. Id at 359.
25. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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for the negligence of the master or crew member." Therefore, after
passage of the remedial acts and until 1970, a seaman was entitled
to 1) a wrongful death action under DOHSA, if death occurred on
the high seas; 2) recovery for injury, if a death was caused by the
negligence of his employer under the Jones Act; and 3) recovery for
injuries for a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness under
N Osceola (which, by the 1940's, was developing into a doctrine of ab-
solute liability with no regard to negligence)." However, if the in-
juries, sustained in territorial waters by virtue of unseaworthiness
without negligence on the part of his employer, resulted in death,
the Jones Act wrongful death provision was exclusive.
In Lindgren v. United States 8 a unanimous Supreme Court said
that, with the Jones Act, Congress had preempted the field so that
recovery for a seaman's wrongful death within territorial waters
could be had only under FELA death provisions, and that Jones Act
recovery "precludes the right of recovery for indemnity for his
death by reason of unseaworthiness of the vessel, irrespective of
negligence, which cannot be eked out by resort to the death statute
of the state in which the injury is received." 9 Thirty-four years later
the Court reaffirmed Lindgren in Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp.," and held that the FELA death provision also could not be
supplemented by a state statute either in a Jones Act action or in a
claim for unseaworthiness.
The position of the seaman was exacerbated further by the deci-
sion in Seas Shipping Company v. Sieracki1 which extended the
warranty of unseaworthiness to a harbor worker who was injured
loading and unloading a ship. In light of the lack of federal coverage
afforded a harbor worker over navigable waters and the inadequacy
of state remedies, the Court extended coverage to those whom it
considered were "doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's
hazards."82 Thus, as of 1970, before the Supreme Court decided
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.," the state of the law in the
event of death was:
1. If death occurred on the high seas, DOHSA provided an ac-
26. Id. at 175.
27. Mahnick v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 100-102 (1944). See Chamless, The
Absolute Warranty of Seaworthiness: A History and Comparative Study, 24 MERCER
L. REV. 519 (1973).
28. 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
29. Id. at 48.
30. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
31. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
32. Id. at 99. See id. at 100-02.
33. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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tion for certain beneficiaries for the death of any "person" caused
by "wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas."
In the case of a non-seaman this action was restricted to one for
a maritime tort with recovery based on negligence. In the case
of a seaman this action could be based on negligence or non-
negligent unseaworthiness, and the recovery in the action
brought by his personal representative came to include both
recovery for pecuniary loss suffered by his dependents under
DOHSA as well as for the decedent's pain and suffering before
death under the survival provision of FELA incorporated into
the Jones Act.
2. If death occurred in territorial waters the status of the
plaintiff dictated the remedy.
a) In the case of a non-seaman, recovery for wrongful death fell
under the relevant statute of the state in whose territorial
waters the death occurred, under a theory of negligence.
b) Furthermore, if the decedent was a "Sieracki seaman" entitled
to recover under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, and he was
unable to prove negligence, his recovery depended upon the
relevant state wrongful death statute encompassing death caused
by unseaworthiness.3 '
c) If the decedent was a Jones Act seaman, his beneficiaries
could not look to state statutes or to the unseaworthiness doc-
trine.
This disparity in treatment has been characterized by the
federal courts as "deplorable," "anomalous," "archaic," "un-
necessary," and "hard to understand."35
Moragne AND PROGENY
Seeking to calm the seas in this area, the Supreme Court in
Moragne overruled The Harrisburg and held that an action lies
under general maritime law for death in territorial waters.36 The
34. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
35. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 159 (1964).
36. Moragne, a longshoreman, was killed while working on a vessel in navigable
waters in Florida. His widow brought an action, both individually and as represen-
tative of her husband's estate, based upon both the negligence of the shipowner and
the unseaworthiness of the vessel to recover damages for wrongful death and for the
pain and suffering experienced by the decedent prior to his death. 398 U.S. at 376.
Following the Florida Supreme Court's holding that no action for unseaworthiness
would lie under Florida law, see Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161
(Fla. 1968), the fifth circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the death claim
based on unseaworthiness, declaring itself bound by the United States Supreme Court
decision in The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). See 398 U.S. at 376-78.
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Court, through Justice Harlan, reasoned that no present policy pro-
hibited recovery for wrongful death, as evidenced by the passage of
state statutes providing a remedy,37 and that "the rule against
recovery for wrongful death is sharply out of keeping with the
policies of modern American maritime law."3 Further, recognizing
that general maritime law principles historically "included a special
solicitude for the welfare of those men who undertook to venture
upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages,"" "'it better
[became] the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty
to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to withhold
it by established and inflexible rules.' "40
Justice Harlan addressed three "anomalies" in the law in order
to further "uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.'
The first was the absence of a general maritime wrongful death ac-
tion arising from the breach of the maritime duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel. Justice Harlan appears to have been referring to
seamen limited to Jones Act wrongful death actions under Lindgren
and Gillespie, as compared to Sieracki-seamen who were not so
limited.
The second anomaly was that identical breaches of the duty to
provide a seaworthy ship that resulted in death produced liability
outside the three-mile limit under DOHSA, but not within state ter-
ritorial waters for a non-seaman if the state statute for wrongful
death did not encompass the unseaworthiness doctrine.
"The third, and assertedly the 'strangest' anomaly [was] that a
true seaman-that is, a member of a ship's company, covered by the
Jones Act-[was] provided no remedy for death caused by
unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a longshoreman, to
whom the duty of unseaworthiness was extended only because he
performs work traditionally done by seamen, does have such a
remedy when allowed by a state statute." 2 This comment was a
direct criticism of Gillespie and Lindgren, cases implicitly overruled
by Moragne.43
37. 398 U.S. at 390.
38. Id. at 387.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 387, quoting The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (Md. 1865).
41. 398 U.S. at 395.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 396 n.12:
A joint contributor to this last situation, in conjunction with the rule of The
Harrisburg, is the decision in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148
(1964), where the Court held that the Jones Act, by providing a claim for
wrongful death based on negligence, precludes any state remedy for wrongful
[Vol. 41
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As to the determination of which beneficiaries will be entitled to
recover under the new action, Justice Harlan did not adopt the
United States' contention, as amicus curiae, that only the provisions
of DOHSA should apply without borrowing from relevant state law.
Rather he left the action's final resolution to "further shifting
through the lower courts in future litigation.""' As to the measure of
damages, the Court noted the persuasive analogy found both in
DOHSA and in the numerous state wrongful death acts. Justice
Harlan concluded that Moragne, in its recognition of a remedy for
wrongful death under general maritime law, could be expected to
bring more "placid waters."'" However, the Moragne opinion seems
to have raised as many questions and problems for further litigation
as it expressly solved.
For example, one might ask: Can the new maritime wrongful
death action be based upon negligence as well as unseaworthiness?
If so, is the seaman precluded from a negligence claim by The
Osceola? After the 1972 amendment to the Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act, denying the warranty of seawor-
thiness to a longshoreman, will the basis for liability in his claim for
wrongful death be limited to negligence even though the seaman's
claim is limited to unseaworthiness? Did the Court intend the new
action to apply to deaths on the high seas, and what will be the in-
terrelationship of the new action with DOHSA in terms of liability,
beneficiaries, and damages? The lack of definitive answers as to
death of a seaman in territorial waters-whether based on negligence or
unseaworthiness. The Court's ruling in Gillespie was only that the Jones Act,
which was "intended to bring about the uniformity in the exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction required by the Constitution .... necessarily supersedes the applica-
tion of the death statutes of the several States." Id., at 155. The ruling thus does
not disturb the seaman's rights under general maritime law, existing alongside his
Jones Act claim, to sue his employer for injuries caused by unseaworthiness, see
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), or for death on the
high seas caused by unseaworthiness, see Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355
U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958); Doyle v. Albatross Tanker Corp., 367 F.2d 465 (C.A.2d
Cir. 1966); cf. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). Likewise, the
remedy under general maritime law that will be made available by our overruling
today of The Harrisburg seems to be beyond the preclusive effect of the Jones
Act as interpreted in Gillespie. The existence of a maritime remedy for deaths of
seamen in territorial waters will further, rather than hinder, "uniformity in the
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction"; and, of course, no question of preclusion of a
federal remedy was before the Court in Gillespie or its predecessor, Lindgren v.
United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930), since no such remedy was thought to exist at
the time those cases were decided. See Gilmore & Black, supra, at 304; but cf.
Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S., at 429-30.
44. Id. at 408.
45. Id.
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status, situs, beneficiaries, and damages has contributed to a line of
cases that appear to have spun anomalies and inconsistencies in
maritime law equal to those problems that Moragne attempted to
resolve.
POST-MORAGNE DEVELOPMENTS
The Moragne Court left two areas, the schedule of beneficiaries
and the measure of damages under the new general maritime
wrongful death action, to "further sifting."'" This further sifting has
led to both a divergence of opinion and a resurrection of anomalous
recoveries depending upon both the situs of the injury from the
shore and the status of the decedent. 4'
In Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet 8 the Supreme Court reached
two significant conclusions in the instance of a longshoreman whose
injuries, which occurred on state navigable waters, did not result in
his death until after he had recovered damages, including loss of
future earnings, on an unseaworthiness claim. First, the Court held
that the widow's maritime wrongful death action was not barred by
the decedent's recovery during his lifetime. Second, the Court re-
jected the contention that DOHSA provided the applicable standard
for damages and aligned itself with a clear "majority of state
wrongful-death acts" by allowing the decedent's dependents
damages for loss of support, services, and society, as well as for
funeral expenses.
49
In seeking to shape the remedy to comport with the policy of
special solicitude for maritime injury, the Court defined "society" as
embracing a "broad range of mutual benefits each family member
receives from the others' continued existence, including love, affec-
tion, care, attention, companionship, comfort and protection"5 not to
be confused with mental anguish or grief which were not compen-
sable under the maritime wrongful death remedy."' "Loss of ser-
vices" was defined as the monetary value of services the decedent
provided and would have provided but for his wrongful death, and
included the nurture, training, education, and guidance that a child
would have received had not the parent been wrongfully killed, as
well as services the decedent would have performed at home or for
46. Id
47. See generally Note, supra note 3.
48. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
49. Id, at 585.
50. Id.
51. Id. at n.17.
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his spouse.52 Thus the stage was set for glaring inconsistencies in
the law.53
Four years after Gaudet, the Supreme Court held in Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham" that, when a death occurs on the high seas,
the statutory pecuniary remedy of DOHSA is controlling. Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, stated:
We recognize today, as we did in Moragne, the value of unifor-
mity, but a ruling that DOHSA governs wrongful death
recoveries on the high seas poses only a minor threat to the
uniformity of maritime law .... It is true that the measure of
damages in coastal waters will differ from that on the high seas,
but even if this difference proves insignificant, a desire for
uniformity cannot override the statute.55
Higginbotham can be contrasted with Skidmore v. Grueninger," a
fifth circuit decision following the lead of Gaudet, which allowed the
husband of a passenger killed in territorial waters to recover for
loss of consortium and loss of society under the general maritime
wrongful death cause of action. The Higginbotham and Skidmore
results appear further at odds when contrasted with the decision in
Christofferson v. Halliburton.57
In Christofferson, the fifth circuit denied the spouse of an in-
jured seaman an action for loss of consortium under both the Jones
Act and general maritime law. The court noted that the Jones Act
specifically provided that an injured seaman, but not his wife, could
maintain an action for damages at law, and further, that FELA
cases applicable to Jones Act actions have held that the wife of an
injured employee has no claim for loss of consortium. This decision,
to some degree, resurrected the disparity of recovery to
beneficiaries for the same loss based upon the status of the injured
party or whether the party was only injured or killed. 8
52. Id at 585.
53. See 414 U.S. at 605 (Powell, J. dissenting).
54. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
55. Id. at 624. See also H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT. 227 (3d
ed. 1980).
56. 506 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1975).
57. 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976). See Maraist, Maritime Wrongful Death-Higgin-
botham Reverses Trend and Creates New Questions, 39 LA. L. REv. 81 (1978).
58. The Christofferson court also relied upon Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceani-
ques, 323'F.2d 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1963), an early New York case
in which the second circuit held that the wife of an injured longshoreman did not have
a cause of action for loss of consortium based upon a warranty of seaworthiness.
Recently, in Doca v. Marina Merc. Nicaraguense, 634 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980), the
second circuit granted the wife of an injured maritime worker a consortium claim, con-
cluding that, since Gaudet, Igneri no longer can be controlling.
1981]
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Ivy, Hlodan and Alvez
Turning to the most recent decisions in this area, the seas
become more confused. In Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc. 9 a fifth
circuit panel held that damages for non-pecuniary loss may not be
recovered in an action premised solely upon the Jones Act for the
death of a seaman in territorial waters. John Ivy, a seaman, was lost
and presumably drowned as he attempted to aid a fellow crewman
who had fallen overboard. The decedent's father instituted a suit
under the Jones Act for negligence and under general maritime law
for unseaworthiness. The jury found the vessel seaworthy, but
found the defendant negligent, and awarded Ivy's parents $50,000
each for loss of support, services, and society.
Judge Rubin, for the panel, noted that Gaudet-type damages
would have been proper if the defendant had been found liable
under both the Jones Act claim and a general maritime claim for
unseaworthiness However, the court, feeling compelled by the
facts and policy underlying Higginbotham, denied loss of society
damages.
Upon rehearing en banc, the fifth circuit again affirmed, this
time compelled by "the settled Jones Act jurisprudence denying
recovery for non-pecuniary loss."'" Judge Rubin for the majority
stated:
The Jones Act remedy for negligence remains unaffected by
either the rules governing damages recoverable for unseawor-
thiness in general maritime law or by changes in those rules.
The Jones Act applies in equal force to the death of seamen on
the high seas, in domestic territorial waters, in foreign ter-
ritorial waters and on land if suffered in the course of employ-
ment as a seaman."2
He also noted:
We do not here reach the issue of whether after Higgin-
botham nonpecuniary damages may be recovered in such an ac-
tion if unseaworthiness is found .... General maritime law does
not provide a cause of action for negligence to a seaman against
his employer supplemental to that created by the Jones Act;
The Osceloa has never been overruled.6 3
59. 585 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd on rehearing, 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979) (en
banc).
60. 585 F.2d at 737 n.6.
61. Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 2927 (1980).
62. 606 F.2d at 528.
63. Id. at n.8 (emphasis added).
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Chief Judge Brown and Judge Kravitch, in a lengthy and
carefully reasoned dissent, criticized the majority for draining
Moragne and Gaudet of their vitality and making much ado of Hig-
ginbotham's silence. They asserted that the court's desire for unifor-
mity had barred a remedy that would comport with the
humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show "special solicitude"
for those who are injured within its jurisdiction. The dissenters
would "choose a disparity in recovery due to location of the accident
over the anomaly of allowing representatives of a Sieracki seaman
to recover damages disallowed representatives of a Blue Water
Jones Act seaman.""4 These points are not without merit!
Following Ivy, the fifth circuit addressed the issue of whether
non-pecuniary damages would be proper for a seaman's death occur-
ring in inland waters when the Jones Act claim was joined with a
valid general maritime claim for unseaworthiness. In Hlodan v. Ohio
Barge Lines, Inc. 5 the court affirmed an award for a deckhand's con-
scious pain and suffering before death, basing the decision upon
Gaudet, irrespective of the Jones Act claim. Hlodan, on almost iden-
tical facts to those in Ivy, drowned while attempting to rescue a
fellow deckhand who had fallen overboard. The two cases differ only
in that the Ivy jury found the ship seaworthy and the Hlodan jury
did not, results that may be limited to the facts of the cases." The
Supreme Court's decision in American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez"7
came next. In light of the denial of certiorari in Ivy, Alvez adds one
more cross current to our confused seas. The Court held that
general maritime law authorized the plaintiff, the wife of a harbor
worker injured non-fatally aboard a vessel in state territorial
waters, to maintain an action for damages for loss of her husband's
society. Alvez' wife had brought an action under general maritime
law on the grounds of negligence and unseaworthiness, seeking
damages for loss of society after her husband, a longshoreman, lost
an eye in an accident aboard ship.
Justice Brennan, in a 4-3 decision, criticized the fifth circuit opin-
ion in Christofferson for inferring from a passage in Gaudet that
non-pecuniary damages were limited in the wrongful death context
64. Id. at 534.
65. 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. See also Allen v. Seacoasts Prod., - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1980) (review of ap-
plicable standards for determining unseaworthiness and negligence in context of
directed verdict).
67. 100 S. Ct. 1673 (1980).
68. This injury occurred prior to the effective date of the 1972 Amendments to
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1970),
which barred future actions for unseaworthiness by Sieracki-seamen.
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and denying such loss of consortium to the wife of an injured
seaman. He asserted that "[wlithin this single body of judge-
formulated law, there is no apparent reason to differentiate between
fatal and nonfatal injuries in authorizing the recovery of damages
for loss of society." 9 Such criticism would be equally applicable to
Ivy. Yet the Supreme Court refused to review the en banc opinion
of the fifth circuit in Ivy. Scholars, lawyers and judges are totally
perplexed by this refusal to consider Ivy in view of the holding in
Alvez." Blue water seamen have historically been "wards" of the
courts; some must question the reasoning of their guardians.
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' BENEFITS-TODAY
Pre-1972 History
Historically, shore-based workers were not entitled to the
special protections of admiralty law afforded to seamen.7' In the early
1900's though, the states adopted workmen's compensation laws
which provided some benefits for longshoremen and harbor workers.
Voluntary compliance with these state procedures, however, was
terminated by the decision in Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen."2
This case declared the New York workmen's compensation statute
unconstitutional as applied to a longshoreman fatally injured on a
gangway over navigable waters. This result was based primarily
upon the need for the uniform operation of maritime law,73 and this
policy has remained a profound influence upon the development of
maritime law up to the present day.
After various unsuccessful attempts to apply state laws to
shore-based workers, Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) in 1927."4 The original
provisions of section 903(a) contained two limitations upon its
69. 100 S. Ct. at 1677 n.8. Specifically the Court criticized the opinion in Christ-
offerson.
70. This denial is more enigmatic given the Supreme Court's citation of Ivy in the
Alvez decision for the proposition that the Jones Act bars damages for loss of consor-
tium "solely by virtue of judicial interpretation of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act .. " Id. at 1678.
71. See 1A BENEDICT, supra note 2. For example, the right of seamen to
maintenance and cure was recognized during the Middle Ages. See G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, JR., supra note 23, at 281. Anglo-American seamen also had the right to con-
tinued wages until the end of the voyage and transportation from any foreign place
back to shipping port. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
72. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
73. Id at 215, 218.
74. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976). See
generally 1A BENEDICT, supra note 2, at § 3; Note, supra note 1, at 682-83.
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coverage. First, the Act was limited to non-seamen employees whose
injuries occurred upon navigable waters; second, compensation
would be paid only if recovery could not be obtained validly under
state law."5 These provisions at once created an arbitrary line of
demarcation-the shoreline-and great confusion and controversy
regarding the jurisdiction of state and federal courts.
The simple navigable waters test"6 created a situation whereby
the shore-based worker would pass in and out of coverage of the Act
each time he crossed the shoreline while performing his work.
Therefore, benefits depended upon the fortuity of the place where
injury occurred without regard to the type of work performed nor
to the attendant risk of injury." The unjustness of this result was
the subject of commentary,"8 but it remained with Congress, rather
than the courts,"9 to rectify the situation.
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the 1927 LHWCA provi-
sions was the language limiting recovery to instances in which
recovery could not be obtained validly under state law. While this
language was initially perceived as incorporating into the Act the
75. The original § 903(a) read:
Compensation shall be payable under this Act in respect of disability or death of
an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if
recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings
may not validly be provided by State law. No compensation shall be payable in
respect of the disability or death of-(1) A master or member of a crew of any
vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any
small vessel under eighteen tons net; or (2) An officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of any
political subdivision thereof.
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1927).
76. The concept appears based upon the mandate of Jensen that the national
character of maritime law required exclusive federal jurisdiction over all navigable
waters, 244 U.S. at 214-18, and that under Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264
U.S. 219 (1924), the broad principles of uniformity did not preclude application of state
compensation laws to longshoremen injured on piers or other extensions of land. See
1A BENEDICT, supra note 2, at § 7; Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212,
216-20 (1969).
77. Compare T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928) (state compensa-
tion allowed for longshoreman standing on dock struck by crane operated aboard ship
and knocked into water) with Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935)
(no state compensation for workman struck by pier-side crane while aboard ship and
knocked onto land). See 4 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 89.23(a) (1976
& Supp. 1977).
78. See Note, supra note 1, at 683. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
10-11 (1972); S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1972), reprinted in [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4707-08.
79. See Nacirema Op. Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 224 (1969).
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"maritime but local" rule,"0 the courts developed conflicting and con-
fusing interpretations." Some courts precluded recovery if the state
could have provided a remedy although it did not do so, others only
if the state actually provided a remedy- 2
With the practical consequences of a doctrine that made state
and federal jurisdictions mutually exclusive obviously intolerable,
the Supreme Court in Davis v. Department of Labor and In-
dustries 3 suggested that there existed an area of overlapping
jurisdiction, "a twilight zone."84 This phase in the conflict of laws
problem was based on two propositions. First, when a case came
before a tribunal, whether state or federal, coverage was presumed
in that forum unless a clear showing otherwise was made. Second, in
this area the court would not reverse for lack of jurisdiction and
thus clear appellate court dockets of much litigation.1
5
While this notion of overlapping jurisdiction appeared to settle
the law for a period, the state and federal courts once again started
to fix the boundaries of the new "twilight zone" in areas of employ-
ment." Therefore, in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Company87 the
Court refused to extend the "twilight zone" doctrine and inter-
preted the Act to cover all injuries to shore-based workers occur-
ring on navigable waters.8" Thus, the shoreline was established as
the sole line of demarcation for recovery under the Act until the
1972 Amendments.89
80. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 23, § 6-49, at 419; Note, On The
Waterfront: The Fourth Circuit Draws The Line at The Point of Rest In A Narrow
Interpretation Of The LHWCA Amendments of 1972, 54 N.C. L. REV. 925, 934 (1976).
See also Grhnt Smith-Porter Ship. Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
81. Compare Continental Cas. Co. v. Lawson, 64 F.2d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 1933) with
United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 639
(1933).
82. Id
83. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
84. Id. at 256. Too many litigants had gone through one court system only to find
that recovery should have been sought in the other. Usually this revelation came too
late to file the proper action. See Larson, The Conflict of Laws Problem Between The
Longshoremen's Act and State Workmen's Compensation Acts, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 699,
702-03 (1972).
85. See Larson, supra note 84, at 704.
86. See, e.g., Moores's Case, 323 Mass. 462, 80 N.E.2d 478, aff'd sub nom.,
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Modres, 335 U.S. 874 (1948); Baskin v. Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 89
Cal. App. 2d 632, 201 P.2d 549 (1949), rev'd, 338 U.S. 854 (1949). See also Larson, supra
note 84, at 705-06.
87. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
88. See Note, supra note 1, at 685.
89. See Nacirema Op. Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969) (LHWCA never applies
unless injury occurs upon navigable waters); Larson, supra note 84, at 710-12.
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The 1972 Amendments cannot be placed fully in context without
a brief discussion of the circular liability problem that developed
under the 1927 enactments. Although LHWCA limited the
employee's action against his stevedore-employer, his remedies
against third parties responsible for his injury were preserved.
Thus, the longshoreman could receive compensation, plus damages
in an action against the shipowner. Double recovery was prevented
by imposing a lien on the longshoreman's recovery in favor of the
stevedore-employer up to the amount of compensation."
This equilibrium was tipped in 1946 by the decision of Seas Ship-
ping Company v. Sieracki,92 which extended the maritime doctrine of
seaworthiness to longshoremen injured while engaged in traditional
seamen's work.93 Shipowners attempted to shift the burden of liability
to the stevedore-employer first by seeking contribution, and when
that failed,94 by an action for indemnity on the stevedore's breach of
the warranty of workmanlike performance. The latter approach was
upheld in Ryan Stevedoring Company v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.9" on
the theory that this warranty was the essence of the contract with
the shipowner."
Thus a pattern of circular liability and litigation became the
norm in longshoremen's personal injury actions, resulting in the
courts being swamped by repetitious suits and stevedore-employers
usually being held liable for damages far in excess of that con-
templated by LHWCA. Various reasons have been advanced for this
development,97 but the low level of benefits provided to injured
longshoremen and the need for increased safety consciousness in
this employment area appear to have provided the best incentives.
Nonetheless, the situation had become virtually intolerable when
Congress finally acted.
90. See Hazen & Toriello, Longshoremen's Personal Injury Actions Under The
1972 Amendments To the Longshoremen's And Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1978).
91. Id.
92. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
93. Id. at 95.
94. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282
(1952) (doctrine of loss sharing will not be extended to non-collision cases).
95. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
96. See Hazen & Toriello, supra note 90, at 4-5; Comment, The Longshoremen's
And Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972: An End To the Cir-
cular Liability And Seaworthiness In Return For Modern Benefits, 27 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 94, 100-02 (1972).
97. See Hazen & Toriello, supra note 90, at 6 n.17.
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1972 Amendments
In drafting the 1972 Amendments, Congress was primarily con-
cerned with two particular modifications. First, it sought to increase
the inadequate benefits accorded injured shore-based workers," and
second, it reduced the problem of circular liability by eliminating
the longshoreman's remedy of seaworthiness under Sieracki." Con-
gress also extended the coverage of the Act to all who could pass a
two-pronged status-situs test. Since movement in this area is most
pronounced, and resolution of the stevedore-shipowner controversies
appears relatively in hand, this article focuses on the statutory
status-situs test.
With the 1972 Amendments, Congress expanded the definition
of "navigable waters" to include "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel."'' Congress also decreased the classes of eligible
98. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3 (1972); S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4698, 4700-01.
99. Id See Hazen & Toriello, supra note 90, at 7-10.
100. Third-party actions brought by LHWCA-covered workers no longer can be
predicated on variations of the non-delegable duty to provide a safe work place. See,
e.g., Hickman v. Jugoslavenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeka, Zvir, 570 F.2d 449 (2d Cir.
1978); Wescott v. Impresas Arm., S.A. Panama, 564 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1977); Gay v.
Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Hazen &
Toriello, supra note 90, at 11 n.33; Sommers, Admiralty, Fifth Circuit Symposium:
Dispensing Justice in the Fifth Circuit, 23 Loy. L. REv. 795 (1977); Note, Admiralty,
Fifth Circuit Survey, 9 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 837, 847-51 (1978).
When the shipowner's negligence is combined with that of the stevedore to produce
injury to the harbor worker, the shipowner is responsible for the full damages. See
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Trans., 443 U.S. 256 (1979). See also Sipple, Admiralty,
Annual Fifth Circuit Survey, 31 MERCER L. REV. 825, 843-47 (1980); Note, The
Shipowner's Limited Liability Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act, 16 Hous. L. REV., 536 (1979).
101. Section 903(a) now reads:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death
of an employee but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring
upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier,
wharf dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area
customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a
vessel). No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death
of-(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel or any person engaged by the
master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net; or (2)
An officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof or of any State
or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof.
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1976) (emphasis indicating change added). The Amendments also
changed the definition of "employer" to correspond with this broadened situs test. 33
U.S.C. § 902(4) (1976).
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persons. Under the original Act an employee was covered unless
specifically excluded; but the Amendments added a specific defini-
tion of employee which the injured party must satisfy in order to be
eligible for relief.02 Furthermore, the troublesome phrase excluding
cases covered under state compensation laws was eliminated.,
The status test was designed to prevent the expanded coverage
of LHWCA from "over-shooting the mark" and being applicable to
any worker injured on navigable waters or adjoining areas. Only
those persons engaged in "maritime employment" are covered.
While various theories were spawned to provide a methodology for
deciding whether a given party was engaged in maritime employ-
ment,'0 4 recently the parameters of the test have been set out fairly
clearly by the Supreme Court.
In Northeast Marine Terminal Company v. Caputo,' the Court
found that two workers, a checker of cargo removed from a con-
tainer and a worker rolling a loaded dolly to the consignee's truck,
were engaged in tasks essential to the loading and unloading of a
vessel.' They were found to be engaged in maritime employment
under the Act. This finding was predicated, in part, on the broad
remedial nature of the statute' 7 rather than on manipulative objec-
tive criteria such as union membership or the terminology used in
the industry. 8 Upon this remedial premise the Court noted the role
"containerization" technology had played in the industry and con-
cluded that container checkers were doubtless engaged in maritime
102. Section 902(3) now reads:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, in-
cluding any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and
any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but
such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any
person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under
eighteen tons net.
33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976).
103. See Note, supra note 1, at 686.
104. Compare I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Bd., 542 F.2d 903 (4th
Cir. 1976) (en banc), modifying, 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975) (point of rest theory) with
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629 (3d
Cir. 1976); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied sub. nom., Halter Marine Fabr., Inc. v. Nulty, 433 U.S. 908 (1977), reaff'd on re-
mand, 575 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub. nom., P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S.
69 (1979). See also Larson, The Conflicts Problem Between The Longshoremen's Act
and State Workmen's Compensation Acts, under the 1972 Amendments, 14 Hous. L.
REV. 287, 306-28 (1977).
105. 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
106. Id at 267.
107. Id at 268.
108. Id at 268 n.30.
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employment."9 In the instance of dolly operators, the Court did not
look to technology but to the occupation. The Court concluded that
coverage was intended if the person's "employment [was] such that
they spend at least some of their time" engaged in enumerated
maritime activity.' In this determination the Court rejected the
point-of-rest theory, jie., the point the stevedoring operation ends
and the terminal operation function begins, in favor of covering
"longshoremen whether or not their particular task at the moment
of injury is clearly a 'longshoring operation' . Thus dolly operators
between containers and consignees were covered.
In P. C. Pfeiffer Company v. Ford"2 the Court went a step fur-
ther. Since "Congress wanted to ensure that a worker who could
have been covered part of the time by the pre-1972 Act would be
completely covered by the 1972 Act,"1 3 the Court concluded that the
geographical situs of injury had no bearing on a claimant's status.
Rather, the majority interpreted the statute to cover all those land-
based occupations engaged in loading and unloading cargo between
ship and land transportation with any "worker responsible for some
portion of that activity as much an integral part of the process ...
as a person who participates in the entire process.".. This construc-
tion should provide guidelines for the courts in future applications." 5
Turning to the situs test contained in the 1972 Act the law is
somewhat more confused than under the status test. However, re-
cent developments have identified the important decisional indicia
for determinations under this test. In Caputo the Supreme Court
briefly discussed this aspect of the 1972 Amendments without grap-
pling with its thornier problems. Factually the case was easy: One
employee was injured in a terminal area which his employer conceded
was a maritime situs. The other was injured on one of two "finger
piers" at a fenced-in facility on the water. One pier was used
specifically for loading and unloading ships; the other, where the in-
jury took place, was utilized only for stripping and stuffing con-
tainers."' The Court began by expressing doubt that the phrase
"customarily used" in the LHWCA modified the word "pier" as well
109. Id at 271.
110. Id at 273. See also Odom Const. Co. v. United States Dept. of Labor, __
F.2d - (5th Cir. 1980).
111. Id at 276. See Annot., 41 A.L.R. FED. 685 (1979).
112. 444 U.S. 69 (1979).
113. Id at 75. See id at 77-78.
114. Id at 83.
115. See, e.g., Price v. Norfolk and Western R. Co., 618 F.2d 1059, 1061 (4th Cir.
1980); Caldwell v. Ogden Sea Transp., Inc., 618 F.2d 1037, 1049-50 (4th Cir. 1980).
116. 432 U.S. at 279-80.
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as "other adjoining areas", but held that even if it did the pier was
part of "an adjoining . . . terminal . . . customarily used . . . in
loading [and] unloading."'. Thus, the employee satisfied the situs
test.
This broad approach to the definition of "terminal" is in keeping
with both the common meaning of the word and the remedial nature
of the Act. However, in the instance of injury in an area that is not
one of the seven specific places listed in section 903(a)-navigable
waters, adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, or
marine railway-the Court left undefined how great a part of the
marine terminal must be used for loading and other operations and
how remote that portion may be from the place of injury and still
satisfy the test.' 8
The fifth circuit has had occasion to interpret the situs test in
such difficult situations. In Jacksonville Shipyards v. Perdue, 9 five
claims were consolidated for review. The panel began its opinion by
stating that it would look past the nomenclature of an employer or
local custom to examine the facts to determine whether a situs is ac-
tually "customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
repairing, or building a vessel." ' Upon the facts of the case, Judge
Tjoflat found that three of the claimants were injured at a situs
satisfying section 903(a) while two were not. In the instance of the
first claimant, who had been injured while securing a military vehi-
cle to a flat car for transportation inland at the Port of Beaumont,
Texas, the parties had conceded situs and the court did not look fur-
ther. 2 ' The second claimant was a shipbuilder injured in a fabrica-
tion shop, 300 feet from the vessel for which the claimant was
designing a part, which the court deemed an adjoining area. 2 The
third successful claimant was a cotton header injured at a pier-side
warehouse used for temporary storage of cargo before loading for
shipment inland.12 3 That panel had no problem concluding that a ship
repairer assigned to dismantle a building at an abandoned marine
117. Id. at 281.
118. See Note, supra note 1, at 694.
119. 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub. nom., Halter Marine Fabr., Inc.
v. Nulty, 433 U.S. 908 (1977), reaffd on remand, 575 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub.
nom. on other grounds, P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979).
120. Id. at 541. See Odom Const. Co. v. United States Dept. of Labor, __ F.2d
__ (site must be used by a statutory maritime employer but not necessarily the
claimant's employer).
121. Id. at 543.
122. Id. at 543-44. See also Ifigalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Morgan, 551 F.2d 61 (5th
Cir. 1977).
123. 539 F.2d at 544.
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shipbuilding facility was not injured at a maritime situs since the en-
tire facility was no longer in use."'
The Perdue court's most extended discussion of situs involved a
claimant who injured his knee when he fell while leaving a bus sup-
plied by his employer to take employees to the office for checking
out on the time clock. The court stated:
There is literally nothing in the record to support a conclusion
that the employer's office was on the navigable waters or in an
"adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading,
unloading, repairing, or building a vessel." The vessel upon
which Perdue was working was a mile away, and the "punch
out" office was a purely clerical and administrative post
separated from the waters by other facilities which likewise
were not used for loading, unloading, ship repair, or ship-
building. [The parties have stipulated that the nearest body of
water was 500 yards away from the office.] Under no reasonable
construction of the Act did this area either "adjoin" the waters
or carry out any of the functions specified in Section 903(a). We
reject the argument that the new Act covers every point in a
large marine facility where a ship repairman might go at his
employer's direction. In the words of the Administrative Law
Judge below, the locus of this injury had "nothing to do with
loading, unloading, building or repairing vessels" (Appendix at
19). Therefore we must reverse the Board's determination that
Perdue is entitled to compensation under the new Act.12
Perdue then should be viewed as setting out several indicia for
determining whether the scene of an injury qualifies as a "situs."
These are, first, the use to which an area is put by employers; sec-
ond, the character of the surrounding facilities; and third, the
distance that the point of injury is from navigable waters without an
absolute set limit.
The Court's second decision in this area, Alabama Dry Dock &
Shipbuilding Company v. Kininess,26 reinforced the Perdue criteria.
In this action an employee fractured his pelvis while sandblasting a
disassembled gantry crane stored in a backlot of the company's
shipyard for eventual use hauling fabricated ship sections to the
water's edge. The court, through Judge Roney, stated:
Alabama Dry Dock cites language in the statute which defines
the situs as one "adjoining" navigable waters. The company
124. Id. at 542.
125. Id. at 541-42 (footnote added to text).
126. 554 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977).
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argues that because the back lot in which the crane was stored
did not abut the water, it is not a maritime situs. The record
does not disclose the position of the lot, and the estimates in the
briefs place it from 150 to 2,000 feet from the water's edge. In
any event, the physical distance is not decisive here. The test is
whether the situs is within a contiguous shipbuilding area which
adjoins the water. Alabama Dry Dock's shipyard adjoins the
water. The lot was part of the shipyard, and was not separated
from the waters by facilities not used for shipbuilding. See Per-
due, supra, 539 F.2d at 542. Furthermore, the lot itself was
"customarily used" for the maintenance and repair work engaged
in by Kininess. It was an area in which work directly related to
shipbuilding was taking place. Cf. Stewart v. Brown & Root,
Inc., 5 B.R.B.S. 37 (ALJ) (Sept. 30, 1976) (worker in shipyard
under construction not covered).
While based upon these two decisions, giving great weight to
the presence or absence of non-maritime buildings in the area is
questionable. This factor should not be regarded as an absolute test.
In Texports Stevedore Company v. Winchester'8 an employee
assigned to maintain, repair, and supply gear used in the loading
and unloading of ships was injured at his employer's gear room. The
court stated:
Respondent's accident did not occur on the dock or pier adjoin-
ing the Houston Shipping Channel but at a gear room which,
though five blocks away, adjoined the docks and associated
buildings. See Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co. v.
Kininess, 554 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1977).
Bearing in mind the test expounded by Judge Tjoflat in Per-
due, it is clear that the N Avenue gear room, housing the gear
used in loading and unloading cargo from ships, was a situs
customarily used for maritime purposes as provided by the
statute. Acknowledging the distance from the gear room to the
water, we cannot, after giving the Act a liberal construction,
reverse respondent's coverage just because the harbor area pro-
vided inadequate facilities for Texports to house their equip-
ment.'"
This case apparently suggests that the proper focus is upon the
127. Id. at 178.
128. 554 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.), as modified, 561 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1977), petition for
rehearing en banc granted, 569 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1978). Oral arguments were heard,
en banc, in June of 1980. 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980).
129. 554 F.2d at 247, as modified by, 561 F.2d at 1213.
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use to which the area is put as well as on the nature of the sur-
rounding facilities. Further, this decision probably indicates that the
disposition of these issues in the future will be on a case-by-case
basis.
While the Texports decision is currently on rehearing en banc,
the writer speculates that the court will not restrict "situs" to
facilities strictly contiguous to navigable waters nor resort to some
arbitrary fence line or railway track as an absolute outer limit of
coverage. ' Such an approach would appear to be linguistically sup-
portable as well as in keeping with the expansive spirit of
Congress.'
CONCLUSION
While confused seas certainly still exist in regard to injury and
wrongful death under Gaudet, the Jones Act, and DOHSA, judicial
gap-filling has proceeded apace to provide a greater degree of
uniformity in the area. Due to the inherently inconsistent nature of
the above authorities, calm is not likely to result without a complete
congressional revamping. Such revamping of LHWCA has reduced
significantly the problems of shore-based workers.'32 Hopefully, the
courts' case-by-case development of the status-situs test soon will
establish sufficient decisional criteria which will reduce the uncer-
tainty that persists in this area to more manageable proportions.
130. See Handcor Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp., 568 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.
1978); Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1978); Dravo
Corp. v. Banks, 567 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1977); Dravo Corp. v. Maxin, 545 F.2d 374 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
131. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 23, § 6-50, at 424.
132. The Supreme Court, in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 100 S. Ct. 2432 (1980),
recently held that a state may apply its workers' compensation scheme to land-based
injuries under LHWCA, thus avoiding the problems of the "maritime but local" rule
and the "twilight zone" doctrines being grafted onto the 1972 Amendments.
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